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1. Introduction
At the start here, I make three preliminary remarks. First, I am sympathetic with David Hitchcock’s
case in support of his thesis that, “there is always a basis for a rational discussion between people
who disagree” (abstract). Second, my commentary turns almost exclusively on Hitchcock’s paper
and also Fogelin’s (2005) paper, which is a slightly updated version of his (1985) paper that
Hitchcock works from. My commentary does not dig into the literature on deep disagreement, with
which I am not familiar. Third, I don’t see that Fogelin’s 2005 paper provides a plausible case
against Hitchcock’s thesis.
In what follows, I begin by trying to clarify some of the conceptual terrain working from the
papers by Hitchcock and Fogelin. Next, I take a stab at articulating Fogelin’s position on the
connection between the possibility of argument and deep disagreement. I then explain why I find
Fogelin’s position lacking in a way that I think is in sync with the case Hitchcock makes in support
of his paper’s thesis. Finally, I conclude.
2. Clarifying the conceptual terrain
Hitchcock tells us that his paper is devoted to addressing the following question.
Under what circumstances if any is it reasonable for someone engaged in an
argumentative exchange with someone else over an issue on which they disagree to
decide that the two of them have a deep disagreement in Fogelin’s sense, to abandon the
use of argument, and to resort to non-argumentative means of persuasion—means that do
not involve an appeal to reasons—in an effort to get the other person to adopt their
position on the issue? (section 2, p. 3)
I take the question to presuppose, for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing as deep
disagreement in Fogelin’s sense. Two different questions can be drawn out of the one explicitly
posed.
(1) When, if at all, is it reasonable for someone engaged in an argumentative exchange with
someone else over an issue on which they disagree to decide that the two of them have a deep
disagreement in Fogelin’s sense?
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Presumably, they must know (or, strongly suspect?) that they are involved in a deep
disagreement. This raises question (1a): How does one know that one is involved in a deep
disagreement? That is, what, exactly, must be ascertained with a high degree of confidence?
(2) When, if at all, is it reasonable for two people in an argumentative exchange who have decided
that they have a deep disagreement in Fogelin’s sense to resort to non-argumentative means of
persuasion in an effort to get the other person to adopt their position on the issue?
I suppose that plausible answers to 2 call upon relevant argumentation norms that are sensitive
to the importance of what is at issue, as well as to other contextual matters, raises another question
(2a): When, if at all, is it reasonable for someone engaged in an argumentative exchange with
someone else over an issue on which they disagree to resort to non-argumentative means of
persuasion in an effort to get the other person to adopt their position on the issue? Quoting
Wittgenstein is nice, but, as Hitchcock suggests, it is hard to see how what Fogelin cites motivates
an answer to 2a and, therefore, to 2. “Intellectual colonialism” is certainly lurking here.
I take answers to 1 and 2 to be independent. Answering epistemic question 1 doesn’t seem to
deliver an answer to the normatively loaded question 2. Conversely, it is unclear to me how an
answer to 2 serves as a plausible guide to 1.
Clarifying questions 1 and 2 requires getting at the gist of Fogelin’s characterization of a deep
disagreement and honing in on its significance to the activity of arguing. Drawing from Fogelin,
Hitchcock takes a deep disagreement to be a “disagreement in which the parties who disagree lack
shared beliefs and preferences from which, using shared procedures for resolving disagreements,
they can reason to a shared position on the issue” (p. 4). According to Fogelin, an outcome of such
a disagreement is that the argumentative context is not normal or nearly normal (2005, p.7). The
significance of this for Fogelin is that “to the extent that the argumentative context becomes less
normal, argument to that extent becomes impossible” (p.7), i.e., “the conditions for argument do
not exist” (p.7). This raises the question: what are the conditions essential to arguing that are
allegedly nullified by a deep disagreement?
3. Fogelin’s position on the connection between deep disagreement and the conditions for
argument
Fogelin remarks that a deep disagreement arises from a clash of underlying principles (2005, p. 8).
What are the relevant underlying principles? Fogelin says that they are “framework propositions,”
in Putnam’s sense, or “rules,” in Wittgenstein’s sense. We get a deep disagreement when the
argument is generated by a clash of framework propositions (i.e., a conflict between them) (2005,
p. 8).
The following argument captures my initial understanding of Fogelin’s connection between
deep disagreement and the possibility of argument.
Fogelin’s argument
1. A clash of framework propositions undercuts an essential condition for arguing.
2. Deep disagreements arise from a clash of framework propositions.
3. Deep disagreements cannot be resolved through arguing.
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I take “arguing” here to be the use of argument—in its reason-giving sense—to persuade another
of the conclusion. Fogelin’s argument is silent on question 2. However, it partially addresses
question 1 by suggesting an answer to question 1a. One knows that one is in a deep disagreement
when one knows that there is a clash of framework propositions relative to the argumentative
exchange at hand. If I follow Fogelin, symptoms of a clash of framework propositions implicit in
a deep disagreement include the disagreement persisting even when normal criticisms have been
answered, and that the disagreement is immune to appeals to facts (2005, p. 9).
It is hard to judge the plausibility of premise (1) and hard to understand premise (2) unless the
technical notion of a framework proposition is clear. Clearly, “framework proposition” is theoryladen. I confess that I am unfamiliar with the literature on Putnam’s notion of a framework
proposition, and I have forgotten Wittgenstein’s notion of a rule. Fogelin doesn’t provide an
account of framework propositions to help me out.
4. Fogelin’s position is not persuasive
Since I am not equipped to bring theoretical considerations regarding framework propositions to
bear on Hitchcock’s plausible case against Fogelin’s argument, I rely on Fogelin’s quick examples
to get at what a clash of framework propositions is supposed to look like. I take Fogelin to be using
these examples to illustrate premise 1. However, it is not clear to me that the examples do illustrate
premise 1. I now elaborate.
Fogelin considers an argumentative exchange about whether race-based quotas are ethical
(2005, p.10). Pro advances a position that commits Pro to the framework proposition A= social
groups can have moral claims against other social groups. Con’s position is associated with the
framework proposition A*= only individuals can have moral claims. The incompatibility (the
“clash”) between A and A* turns on the claim that social groups do not count as individuals. Is it
true that argument is impossible regarding what counts as an individual? After all, there is a healthy
legal debate on whether corporations are individuals with rights. I am unfamiliar with the literature
on the metaphysics of individuals, but it is far from obvious to me that arguing is impossible here.
Fogelin uses the abortion debate to illustrate a “clash of framework propositions necessary for
deep disagreements. Is abortion in all cases the killing of a person? Pro believes P=that life begins
shortly after conception. Con rejects P. Pro’s reason for her P-belief is that Pro accepts framework
proposition F= shortly after conception God implants an immortal soul into the fertilized egg
thereby bringing a person into existence. Pro’s acceptance of F derives—in some way—from Pro’s
commitment to a way of life as, say, a Catholic. Con does not accept F and does not share Pro’s
commitment to a Catholic way of life.
Here I take the example to illustrate that the clash over F generates a deep disagreement in
Pro’s and Con’s argumentative exchange about whether abortion in all cases is the killing of a
person. Are the conditions for further argument thereby nullified? It seems to me that Fogelin
himself leaves open some wiggle-room for a negative response.
[Deep Disagreements] remain recalcitrant to adjudication because the sources of the
disagreement—the framework propositions—are allowed to lie in the background,
working at a distance. The way to put the debate on a rational basis is [to] surface these
background propositions and then discuss them directly. (2005, p. 8)
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Why is it necessary that rational discussion in the context of deep disagreement about conflicting
framework propositions precludes the possibility of the use of argument in its reason-giving sense?
If Pro aims to persuade Con to accept P on the basis of Pro’s reasons, then Pro would have to
convert Con to the Catholic way of life. Perhaps not a promising dialectical strategy. Nevertheless,
with all due respect to Wittgenstein, it is not obvious to me that the use of argument is impossible
in the attempt to rationally persuade an individual to adopt the Catholic way of life. Such an attempt
doesn’t seem immune to facts and isn’t obviously invulnerable to “normal” criticisms. The devil
is in the details.
In short, I don’t see offhand that Fogelin’s quick examples of deep disagreement—in his
sense—illustrate that deep disagreement necessarily rules out the possibility of arguing. What
does seem to be the case in both examples is that in order for participants in the sample
argumentative exchanges to directly engage a deep disagreement through rational discussion there
is a change of topic. There is a move from the ethicality of race-based quotas to the metaphysics
of individuals and a move from the topic of whether abortion kills an individual to reasons for
adopting the Catholic way of life.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, I see Hitchcock’s case against Fogelin turning on the plausibility of rejecting that a
clash of framework propositions undercuts an essential condition for arguing, i.e., turns on
rejecting premise 1 of what I am calling Fogelin’s argument. I think that Hitchcock advances a
plausible case against premise 1, but, again, I don’t really know what a framework proposition is
supposed to be. If there are no such propositions associated with an argumentative stance, then I
don’t understand the disagreement about deep disagreements—in Fogelin’s sense.
Of course, even if Fogelin’s examples are bad or easily become caricatures of argumentative
exchanges when filled out, that doesn’t show that there are no framework propositions or that
premise 1 is false. I am reminded of David Lewis’ letter to the editors of a collection of papers on
the law of non-contradiction (Letter 1, 2004), explaining why he declined their offer to submit a
paper in support of his position that the law of non-contradiction is correct. The editors received
permission to publish the letter. In it, Lewis writes that he’s incapable of writing the requested
paper in part because every argument in defense of the law of non-contradiction, that he is aware
of, that has a chance to be plausible either appeals to principles in dispute and thus begs the
question, or appeals to principles so much less certain than non-contradiction.
Perhaps, we can say that P is a framework proposition relative to an arguer’s argumentative
stance when the arguer is unable to produce an argument in defense of P that grounds her certainty
of P and that is neither circular nor question-begging against the relevant contrary stance(s). This
makes it a little easier for me to see how a “clash” of framework propositions can stalemate an
argumentative exchange in a way that motivates eschewing arguments without necessarily
dismissing the legitimacy of contrary points of view. However, subsequent rational discussion can
meaningfully deepen participants’ understanding of the involved points of view, which can give
rise to new arguments that modify their point of view or extinguish the stalemate. For me, this is
a takeaway from David Hitchcock’s paper that is valuable because it motivates further thinking
about the significance of a diagnosis of deep disagreement—in Fogelin’s sense or otherwise.
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